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by Peter Bain

1. Background

While differences and problems persist concerning both definition and numbers, it would be generally accepted that at least 500,000 people (around 2% of the total workforce) are employed in UK call centers (Datamonitor, 2002; IDS 2002; LFS 2001; Taylor & Bain, 2001a). Although the rate of growth has declined, the number of employees still appears to be rising. As many workers, in a huge range of occupations and industrial sectors, use computers and telephones in carrying out their daily tasks, we have defined a call centre as,

A dedicated operation in which computer-utilising employees receive inbound – or make outbound – telephone calls, with these calls processed and controlled either by an Automatic Call Distribution (ACD) or predictive dialling system.

The most important concentrations are to be found in the broad finance sector (banks, insurance, financial services), which employs about one-third of call center workers, and in media/telecommunications where a further 20% are located. In the last two-three years, outsourcing in general and the public sector (e.g. local government, health service) have been among the most rapidly expanding growth areas. The tendency, since the late 1990s, to provide internet as well as telephone, e.mail and fax facilities has been reflected in the increasing usage by organizations of the appellation ‘customer contact center’ to describe their operations.

The composition of the call center workforce is roughly two-thirds female and one-third male, with the majority under the age of 30. Most workers are employed on full-time - and one-third on part-time - permanent contracts, and less than 10% are temporary, agency staff. Traditional ‘nine to five’ office hours have been superseded by a requirement to work ‘24/7’ and a range of other shift systems in alignment with perceived customer demand or availability. More than three out of four employees are engaged in a variety of inbound and/or outbound ‘call-handling’ functions, and are typically described as Customer Service Advisors or Representatives (CSA/CSR). The remainder of employees are designated team leaders, supervisors, managers, and there are also relatively small numbers of technical back-up and administrative staff.

Whilst call centers are defined, in essence, by the integration of computer and telephone technologies, many differences exist in work organization and call complexity (Kinnie et al, 2000; Batt, 2000). Particularly crucial distinctions can be drawn between whether management prioritizes the quantity or quality of employee calls, and operations range from the simple, volume-driven and routinized, to the complex and customized (Taylor and Bain, 2001b). Notwithstanding these organizational and functional differences, management has sought to establish ‘frontiers of control’ which, in the majority of call centers, means repetitive, routinized work, embodying new Taylorist developments. As a consequence, many call center workers experience work as intensive, target-driven and generally stressful (resulting in ‘burnout’), and attribute the compulsion to meet targets as the principal source of pressure in the performance of daily tasks (Bain et al, 2002). Other aspects of the labour process are also widely regarded as contributing to the pressures of the job – lack of time between calls, repetition and monotony of tasks, infrequency and brevity of breaks, strict interpretation of performance measurements, and the stress arising from the requirement to continuously perform emotional labour.

During the 1980s and 1990s, like their counterparts in most of the older industrialised countries, trade unions in the UK recorded significant falls in both individual membership and workforce density. Since 1979, aggregate membership has fallen from over thirteen to less than eight million, while density fell from 54% of all employees to 31-32% over the same period (i.e. from a half to a third). However, this decline appears to have bottomed out over the last 3-4 years, due primarily to the combination of more focused union recruitment policies, including the establishment of a TUC ‘Organising Academy’ (Heery et al, 2000), and the effects of the 1999 Employment Relations Act (ERA).

As discussed earlier, in many call centers, the content and organisation of work combines with attendant management policies to pressurise employees to remain engaged in continuously handling calls at their workstation over long periods of time. This presents unions who have gained access with the basic problem of how to communicate with both potential and existing members. For union organizers forced to operate from the outside, these difficulties are increased by the physical location of many call centres - in multi-tenanted office buildings or suburban business parks – to which they can be denied entry. And, overshadowing these problems, stands the ever-present threat to even well-organized workplaces from high employee turnover (‘churn’), requiring unions to continually recruit simply to maintain existing levels of membership

Although some surveys have suggested that as many as two-thirds of UK call center workers are employed by companies who recognise and bargain with unions (IDS 2002; IRS 2001), these findings may have been distorted by a low response rate from large, non-union firms, and from smaller organizations in general. Thus, while unions have a strong presence in certain areas, the overall picture is uneven. Sectorally, unions are relatively strong in the public sector, utilities, and finance, but much weaker in IT, media and outsourcing. In many instances, where unions had existing recognition and bargaining agreements with the employer, they were able to extend coverage to these organizations’ call center operations when these were established. While these agreements were important in establishing union presence in call centers generally, the focus in this paper will be to briefly summarize developments and trends in companies who resisted union organization and refused recognition.

Some companies with call centers in the UK have consistently and vigorously opposed union presence. These include organizations whose parent companies have a record of long-standing antipathy to trades unionism per se . In the finance sector, Midland Bank (owned by the Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation), Virgin and Direct Line (owned by the Royal Bank of Scotland) are among those who have resisted unionisation of their call centres. Other stalwart anti-union employers with big call centers in the UK include IBM and BSkyB (owned by Rupert Murdoch).

One of the best-known union organizing struggles in UK call centers was that involving the Communication Workers Union (CWU) at Excell Multimedia in Glasgow. This Arizona-based outsourcing company, established in 1994, was virulently anti-union, and was awarded its first UK telecommunications contract by Cable and Wireless in 1995. By 1998, continuous work intensification, combined with an extremely harsh management style, had driven a small number of workers to join the CWU. Some early recruitment success, utilising an ‘organizing model’ approach and techniques, was consolidated through union-led protests over management’s failure to take remedial action over problems concerning the reliability of the vital telephone ‘emergency services’ facility. Despite the victimization of leading union activists, an up-front, public campaign attracted widespread support and led to the termination of Excell’s contract in March 2000. The CWU’s response nationally was to pursue a ‘partnership’ agreement with the new outsourcing employer, Vertex, and it was October 2002 before the 1,000-strong workforce in their Glasgow and Birmingham call centers received the opportunity to vote (overwhelmingly) for representation by the CWU.

Developments at Barclaycall, a subsidiary of Barclay’s Bank, perhaps reflected a more general shift in the industrial relations climate. The company had vigorously opposed union recognition at their call centres in Salford, Coventry and Sunderland, despite an active UNIFI campaign dating back to 1994, and the achievement of 90% union density at Barclaycard in Kirkby. In 1999, the company, planning radical changes to long-standing terms and conditions, shifted its stance in favour of a ‘partnership’ approach, and granted the union access to its call centres (IRSER 1999a: FSDSF, 1999). However, a ballot of employees, in which 89% had voted in favour of union recognition in a 76% turnout, was also undoubtedly a crucial factor in persuading Barclays to reconsider their stance. The opportunities opened up at Barclaycall reflected both worker discontent and union determination to continue recruitment, despite unrelenting management hostility, including legal injunctions against a union official (TUC, 1998b). A solid membership platform, based on the recruitment of around 15% of the workforce, paved the way for subsequent expansion

Delegates to a Finance Sector Unions’ conference described a variety of recruitment tactics they had adopted in hostile call center environments (FSU, 1999). These included health and safety representative systematically contacting non-members when carrying out workplace inspections, and using the opportunity to publicise the union. In some call centers, reps built union credibility by taking a strong stand in defence of employees on disciplinary charges - in one location, three-quarters of the workforce faced disciplinary action at the same time. Another common practice was for members to supply the union with information so that new employees could be targeted – and, to make the union more attractive, to offer potential recruits lower subscription rates. In some workplaces, the union utilised the company intranet to contact both members and non-members, or used company logos to make recruitment leaflets appear more ‘official’. One representative reported how the union had adopted a philosophy of ‘sticking our nose in everywhere’ and had negotiated a relaxation of the company’s unpopular, strict dress code.

It is also important to note instances of union co-operation in organizing call centers. First, at a general level, the main confederation, the Trades Union Congress (TUC) has been committed to developing union activity in call centers since 1998, when a motion was unanimously passed at the annual conference, stating,

…this new area of employment is too often characterised by anti-trade union attitudes on the employers side…the General Council should co-ordinate a union membership campaign involving all affiliates with interest in this important area of future membership growth.

(TUC, 1998a)

In November 1998, sixteen unions were represented at a TUC call center organizing seminar. Discussion focused on overcoming basic problems, such as how to contact geographically and socially isolated workers, as well as on bargaining agenda priorities (TUC, 1998b). Concern was also expressed about the dangers of inter-union competition and mutually destructive ‘beauty contests’. In 2000, these issues were further debated and the General Council charged with three tasks: first, to co-ordinate call center unionization, and to introduce procedures to avoid inter-union competition; second, to engage with the Call Centre Association (the employers), in developing ‘core industry standards’; third, to publicise the findings of a Health and Safety Executive investigation into call centers. Consequently, a report on working conditions was published (TUC, 2001a) and, in February 2001, a TUC telephone and e-mail hotline was contacted by 774 call centre workers in two weeks. (TUC, 2001b)

At a sectoral level, building on moves towards closer co-operation stimulated by a sustained employer offensive (Gall, 1997), from 1996, the Finance Sector Direct Staff Forum (FSDSF) met on a regular basis to discuss call center issues. The FSDSF (later FCCF – Finance Call Centre Forum) brought together the big unions with a host of smaller organizations, who had typically started life as management-initiated staff associations set up to represent workers in individual companies (Bain & Taylor, 2002). The increased tempo of company mergers and take-overs encouraged union mergers, with that in 1999 creating a new union (UNIFI) of around 200,000 members. While it would be misleading to suggest that inter-union rivalries no longer existed, there was clearly an appreciation of the need to collaborate, forced on the unions by developments in the sector. In particular, the rapid growth of call centers was seen to present problems requiring a united response. Through the FCCF, the unions and staff associations met regularly to discuss call center issues and share information about problems and successes. This co-operation was undoubtedly perceived to be of general benefit, particularly by the smaller unions, and encouraged further moves towards formal mergers (FSDSF, 1999).

As call center employers have become increasingly conscious that there are problems and issues which cannot be avoided, there have been indications that they are doing so on a collective basis. Although these tendencies are at a formative stage, historically, employers’ associations have been depicted as,

…reactive institutions which have come into being to protect members from the activities of unions or the state or both…(and) have sought to regulate trade and competition, to provide a united front in negotiations, and to provide a range of services.

(Plowman, 1991)

In the UK, the Call Centre Association (CCA) boasts over 600 corporate members, including many trans-nationals from a variety of sectors, as well as organizations from the fast-expanding outsourcing and public sectors (CCA, 2002). Partly in response to hostile media coverage, but also because of concerns over issues such as the Employment Relations Act and the BT call center strike, the CCA (2000) produced a ‘Standard for Best Practice’. This set out processes aiming to ensure that the treatment of both customers and employees is of the highest standard, and has been endorsed by the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI).

The fact that an association of call center employers has been established is a significant development, even if, at this stage, their role is extremely limited and does not extend to direct involvement in the conduct of the employment relationship. However, it is clear that the Standard for Best Practice reflects serious concerns amongst member firms about how to handle day-to-day workplace problems and issues. Another significant and related trend has been the formation of local employers’ groups in areas of high call center concentration, such as Glasgow and Leeds. These bodies meet regularly to discuss issues and developments in their areas, and pay and conditions of employment are high on the agenda (Parle, 1999). This pattern of initially meeting on a local or regional basis to discuss mutual problems, reflects the processes by which employers’ associations with much wider aims and responsibilities have developed historically (van Waarden, 1995).

Increasingly the CCA seems to be performing a regulatory and an industrial relations advisory role but, of course, this is still a far cry from systematic bargaining with unions. Given the traditions and bargaining structures of the UK system, any such direct involvement by the CCA is difficult to imagine in the foreseeable future.

Although confronted by many hostile employers in call centers (and elsewhere), the overall legislative position of British workers and their unions is one of the most restricted amongst the capitalist democracies. During the eighteen years (1979-97) of the Conservative government’s unrelenting attacks upon the trade union movement, to the extent that any pro-worker measures were enacted, they emanated from the European Union (EU). In general, this has remained the situation since the election of the Blair government, whose adherence to the supremacy of ‘market forces’ and the US Bush administration has placed them in alliance with the most right-wing governments in the EU (Berlusconi in Italy, Aznar in Spain). The 1999 ERA only brought the UK into line with the minimum standards of the EU, introducing, for the first time, a legal right to join a trade union, provided 50%-plus-one of those employed in the ‘unit’ agreed, and the right of workers to representation on disciplinary or grievance issues in non-union workplaces. Apart from this measure, all of the Conservative anti-union legislation remains on the statute book. As McKay (2001) has stated, ‘It remains the case that the UK legal regime regulating industrial action is the most restrictive in all the EU states’ (p.297), while the International Labour Organisation (ILO) has ruled that ‘the UK remains in breach of international law on freedom of association and the right to organize’ (p. 298).

While outsourcing is utilised in many areas of the economy, it has proved particularly problematic for unions seeking to organize the rapidly expanding call center workforce. As 60-70% of total call center costs are accounted for by labor costs, outsourcing companies place much emphasis upon being able to perform work more cheaply than potential clients. Thus, in a competitive business environment, workers in the outsourcing organisation are put under pressure to restrain their wage demands, while those employed by the client company can be threatened with loss of jobs if they seek to defend or improve conditions. As UK unions are generally more strongly organized in call centers operated by longer-established companies than by outsourcing firms, the threat to union organization and working conditions is clear. Not only have some indigenous call center outsourcers – such as Capita, Thus and Vertex - expanded extremely rapidly in the UK in recent years, so too have US-based multi-nationals like Teletech, Sitel and Excell. While some organizing successes have been notched up among the outsourcers, notably, the removal of Excell and unionisation of Vertex discussed earlier, in the main, unions have failed to seriously address this issue.

A further twist of the screw has been applied in the last year with the threatened migration of call center jobs to India, where pay rates are a fraction of those in the UK, and where English-speaking graduates are available for employment. While much of the media coverage has been superficial, badly-informed and exaggerated, nevertheless, there clearly is a real issue for unions, with companies in the finance and telecoms sectors being particularly active in this field. While back office and other clerical and administrative functions would appear to lend themselves more easily to transfer, some call center work has also been moved to India by a number of UK companies. However, so far, much of the transferred work has been at the ‘low value’ end of the quality spectrum, and legal constraints, as well as turnover and communication problems in India, could place further constraints on outsourcing companies’ aspirations to ‘move up the value chain’. Furthermore, UK unions have intervened in companies such as Prudential Assurance, British Telecom (BT), Axa Insurance and Reality to negotiate and seek assurances concerning threats to existing UK jobs from proposed expansion in India.

A number of unions have produced publications specifically dealing with call center issues (BIFU, 1996: GMB, 2000; MSF, 1999; UNISON, 1998, 2001) but, while these have identified the full range of problems which occur, in practice, unions have tended to confine themselves to a much more narrow agenda. Even where they have a significant presence and collective bargaining rights, for the most part, UK unions have not negotiated proactively over questions relating to the organization and content of call center work, and have tended to concentrate on a pay and conditions agenda. However, the concerns which call center operators express, arising from their daily experience of an intensive and pressurised labour process, are matters which they want unions to raise in addition to the issues covered by the ‘traditional’ agenda (Taylor & Bain, 2000). Reduced targets, more and longer breaks, relaxed call handling times, and higher staffing levels are demands which relate directly to the pace and intensity of work and which, to date, have largely remained beyond the scope of bargaining. Indeed, it could be argued that these demands address the factors listed by the Health and Safety Executive (HELA, 2001) as possibly contributing to problems in call centers, and could be adopted by unions as the basis of a broad agenda for negotiations over ‘production’ issues (Taylor et al, 2003).

However, there are cases which exemplify this approach, and which show that unions can intervene in order to counter intensive target-setting and unacceptable management practices. The one-day strike by 4,000 British Telecom call center employees, in November 1999, was directed specifically at the company’s insistence on strict employee adherence to targets of 285 seconds per call and, more generally, against a harsh management style perceived to be reflected in a ready use of disciplinary measures. The CWU succeeded in convincing BT to remove individual targets for employees, and gained a commitment that managers would adopt a more consultative and sympathetic approach to production-related problems. BT also agreed to establish a pilot scheme in which employees would be allowed to resolve customer problems without being subject to time targets. (CWU, 2000)

Many organizational lessons can also be drawn from the experiences at Excell and Barclaycall, but we will confine ourselves to a few. Firstly, if a substantial union presence can be built in these extremely hostile environments, then unions are capable of recruiting in any unorganised call center. Secondly, that relative success depended on the resilience of workplace activists in sustaining efforts over many months, and small incremental gains in membership have to be nurtured and encouraged. Thirdly, the process of ‘coming out’ as union members requires courage and sound tactical judgement as to timing. Fourthly, the appeal of the union to potential members depends upon the ability to articulate the real concerns of workers, many of whom are coming to trades unionism for the first time. Finally, the degree of support given to activists in these sorts of conditions by the union concerned, and by the wider movement, can be critical in achieving longer-term success.

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